Abstract: Biotechnology has the potential to provide the answers to some of the developing world's most intractable problems. There is scope for developing countries to interpret the provisions of the WTO TRIPS Agreement on biotechnology at different levels, as evidenced by differing interpretations in the developed world. Equally, however, demands of developing countries on biodiversity-related issues can be countered through the ambiguities in the Convention on Biological Diversity. Instead of attempting to amend TRIPS, developing countries should aim to obtain access to the new technologies, at reasonable terms, by collaboration and not confrontation with their owners, with the help of multilateral developmental institutions.
Introduction
Biotechnology, a modern science less than 30 years old, is revolutionizing production in both industry and agriculture in certain areas. It has the potential to provide the answers to some of the world's most intractable problems concerning agriculture, health, nutrition and the environment. Two sectors where biotechnology has already made significant contributions are pharmaceuticals and agriculture. While it is true that this technology has so far been dominated by corporations based in industrialized countries, mainly the USA and Europe, and has tackled mostly problems pertaining to these countries, its potential to solve problems in developing countries cannot be denied.
In particular, developing countries have long possessed capabilities for plant breeding, mainly through public sector research institutions, for which biotechnology now provides new tools. Paradoxically, so far, developing countries have generally been wary that this technology may have adverse effects on health and the environment. Since many of the new biotechnological products and processes are protected by intellectual property rights (IPRs), additional concerns on access to these technologies tend to cloud the debate in developing countries and in international forums such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).
IPRs for biotechnological inventions also raise related but quite distinct sets of issues concerning equity. Northern firms are accused of pirating and patenting biological material and traditional knowledge from the gene-rich developing world for profit, without fair and equitable sharing of benefits or the appropriate transfer of the new technologies as called for by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). These countries see the control of access to genetic resources and some form of intellectual property protection for traditional knowledge, including that incorporated in farm-bred varieties, as necessary steps towards bringing about the required transfer of technology and equity. These countries have become increasingly vocal in the WTO on these concerns of 'biopiracy' and its link to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
This paper aims to describe the obligations of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on biotechnological inventions under TRIPS and their interpretation so far by developed and developing countries. It also examines the provisions of the CBD and the link between this treaty and the TRIPS Agreement [1] . This paper is divided into six further sections: Section 2 discusses the relevant provisions in the WTO TRIPS Agreement on biotechnology and some of the interpretation so far by developed and developing countries; Section 3 discusses the link of biodiversity to IPRs and explains the relevant provisions of the CBD; Section 4 outlines the prospects for the review of TRIPS provisions in the WTO on biotechnological inventions and Section 5 concludes with recommendations for the way forward for developing countries on these complex issues.
TRIPS and biotechnology
At the time of the negotiations on TRIPS in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the USA and the EU differed in their approaches to patenting of biotechnological inventions. While the USA believed that 'anything under the sun made by man', except for human beings, was patentable, the EU was grappling with strong internal resistance to patents on living organisms. Since the debate had not yet been settled in Europe, it was agreed to retain a minimal agreement while committing to revisit this provision within four years from the entry into force of TRIPS i.e. by 1999. Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS incorporates this minimal agreement.
Patent protection for biotechnological inventions
Under Article 27, TRIPS obliges patents, for both processes and products, to be granted in all fields of technology. Article 27.3(b), however, allows the exclusion of plants and animals and of essentially biological processes for their production, from patent grant but obliges the protection of microorganisms and microbiological or non-biological processes for their production.
This exclusion goes beyond the exclusion of 'plant and animal varieties' under the European Patent Convention (EPC), adopted in many other national patent laws of developed and developing countries. Thus, the TRIPS obligation is not subject to the definition of a 'variety', making some of the debate in Europe irrelevant in the interpretation of this provision. However, there is uncertainty on the definitions of certain terms such as 'non-biological' or 'essentially biological'. But clearly micro-organisms and microbiological processes were not excluded from patent protection, despite resistance from some developing countries. It is important to note that even during the TRIPS negotiations, the East Asian participants, notably Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, had no objections to the patenting of microorganisms or microbiological processes.
TRIPS, in Article 28.2, extends the rights of process patentees to the product directly obtained from the patented process. Thus patented microbiological processes would give their owners product-patent-like rights over the products produced directly with the use of these processes. Can WTO members choose to exclude such rights if the products resulting from microbiological or other technical processes are plants and animals? The answer is not clear. The EU, for instance, does not allow such exclusion while Norway does. Both options, therefore, seem open at present.
TRIPS does deal with the ethical, moral aspects of biotechnology (and other technologies) or biosafety by allowing under Article 27.2 patent exclusions of inventions "the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment". Thus, while such exclusions can be made, the caveat that the prohibition of commercial exploitation was necessary would apply. This also means that countries that choose to exercise this option would then forego the benefits of the new innovations. Clearly, TRIPS does not take away the right of countries to prohibit, restrict or condition the use of any invention even after patents are granted. Article 28 of TRIPS follows the universal principle in all national patent laws by only granting right holders the power to exclude others from using their protected products or processes without authorization. In other words, patent owners have a negative right to exclude others from using, but no positive right to use, their inventions.
It is important to note that the three universally recognized criteria of patentability now incorporated into Article 27.1 of TRIPS -novelty, non-obviousness and industrial applicability or utility -also apply to biotechnological inventions. However, the distinction, relevant to patentability, between the 'discovery' of something that exists in nature and the 'invention', or the creation of something new involving a pre-determined degree of human effort or intervention, is, in practice, difficult to make in the field of biotechnology. Almost all industrialized countries and some developing ones now allow the patenting of products of nature, if isolated by technical, non-obvious means. Utility is also broadly interpreted so that it is adequate if a future credible use is mentioned in the patent application. These terms are left undefined under TRIPS, leaving countries free to set higher standards to exclude trivial improvements or non-novel products or those whose utility is yet to be clearly determined.
One of the key concerns in the area of IPRs and biotechnology is the patenting of research tools or the grant of overly broad patents that could potentially block further useful research [2] . TRIPS provides a way out under Article 30 on exceptions to patent rights and Article 31 on other use without the authorization of the patentee. Article 30 allows limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, "provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner". Significantly, under this provision TRIPS allows the legitimate interests of third parties to be taken into account. Most legal experts agree that under this provision non-commercial use of a patented product or process for research and experimental purposes would be permitted. Indeed, most patent laws allow this type of exception, the only difference being in how strictly they define 'non-commercial'.
Article 31 goes further to vest WTO members with the power to authorize third parties to use the patented invention even against the will of the patent owner under certain conditions. Significantly, the grounds on which such compulsory licenses can be granted is not restricted under TRIPS. It is now widely accepted that, by and large, these conditions are not unduly constraining on developing country governments [3] . In the case where the reason for such a grant is stated to be the working of a later patent, which cannot be done without infringing an earlier one, additional restrictive conditions apply. The second or subsequent patent must involve an important technical advance of considerable economic significance relative to the first patent and the owner of the first patent is equally entitled to cross-licence the second patent on reasonable terms.
However, a note of caution is warranted: compulsory licences can, by definition, only help where the working of the invention does not require the co-operation of the patent owner. This is the case of 'copiable' technologies. Where technologies are difficult to reverse engineer, notwithstanding the full disclosure requirements in patent law, such licenses are less useful to developing countries. Biotechnological inventions meet the disclosure requirements by deposit of the starting biological material and there is an international treaty that governs the rules in this regard. Under these rules, the biological material is available to the public under certain conditions. However, even with this and a reading of the technical processes disclosed in a patent, biotechnological inventions may not always be easy to replicate. Indeed, the ability to reverse engineer such processes and products may vary significantly amongst different developing and least developed countries, making the policy instrument of compulsory licences less useful than is widely recognized.
Many other countries such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Singapore now have laws similar to the USA on the patenting of biotechnological inventions, including the patenting of plant and animal varieties. After a decade of discussion in the highest policy bodies, the European Union passed a new directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions in July 1998. Europe has now gone almost as far as the USA on the patenting of biotechnological inventions as plants and animals per se are patentable, although plant and animal varieties are still excluded.
However, farmers' privilege, to re-use patented plants or animals, has been allowed. On the other hand, Canada and Norway exclude from patentability plant and animals per se, including their varieties and even define micro-organisms narrowly. Developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil and the Andean Group, that have implemented TRIPS so far, clearly allow patents only for micro-organisms and microbiological processes, excluding plants, animals, genes and other biological material even if isolated by technical processes. The Brazilian patent law has the clearest enunciation of this exclusion [4] . In addition, these Latin American countries have clearly allowed for compulsory licences and research exemptions in their patent laws. Whether these interpretations are TRIPS-compatible or not will only be known if, after the expiry of the grace period allowed for TRIPS implementation to developing countries by January 2000, some of these issues are raised as WTO disputes.
Protection of plant varieties
Under 27.3(b) of TRIPS, if plants are excluded from patent protection, at least an effective sui generis system must be put in place for the protection of new plant varieties. In other words, plant breeders' rights (PBRs) are to be protected despite the optional exclusion from the patenting of plants. Countries can also opt to give both choicespatents and PBRs -for the protection of plants.
Unlike in the other subjects under TRIPS, there is no mention of adherence to the preexisting international convention, UPOV, a French acronym for the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, nor to any specific details on scope of coverage, term of protection and limitations to such protection. One possible reason for this is that, at the time of the TRIPS negotiations, a reference to UPOV 1978 was considered inadequate while reference to UPOV 1991 was premature, as it had not entered into force. Another reason for the brevity of this provision could be that there was no agreement amongst industrialized countries themselves as to the details of an effective system of protection for plant varieties. The end result is that countries are free to construct their own individual regime for such protection, provided it meets the standard of 'effectiveness'.
Despite this considerable leeway given in TRIPS many read the term 'effective' as meaning UPOV-based legislation, some going even as far as reading a requirement to comply with the latest version of UPOV passed in 1991. This has led to considerable controversy, with a variety of suggestions on what developing countries should do in this area. Since it was UPOV 1978 that existed at the time of the TRIPS negotiations, it could be considered as a model for developing countries to frame their legislation, provided that they otherwise ensure TRIPS-compatibility [5] . Such a law may contain provisions for the 'breeders' exemption', allowing the use of the protected variety for breeding purposes and may also contain the 'farmers' privilege', allowing farmers to retain seed for their own use or for across-the-fence non-commercial exchange or sales of seeds.
UPOV 1991, on the other hand, disallows some of this flexibility in that the exchange or sale of seeds by farmers is disallowed and confines the breeders' exemption to varieties that are not 'essentially derived' from the protected one. There are other crucial differences, notably that the later version extends to all genera and species, expands exclusive rights to patent-like rights of reproduction, importing or stocking, extends exclusive rights to harvested materials such as cut flowers, timber, fruits and lastly, extends the minimum term of protection from 15/18 years to 20/25 years for plants/vines or trees respectively. Both versions, however, allow restrictions on the free use of exclusive rights for reasons of public interest, for example, through compulsory licences, subject to the payment of an equitable remuneration to the right holder. The extension of time given particularly to encourage developing countries to join UPOV 1978, ended in April 1999. Only UPOV 1991 is open to membership now. The differences explain why developing countries preferred joining the 1978 version, although some have adopted features in their laws that are close to the 1991 version.
Today several developed and developing countries have plant variety protection laws that are modelled on UPOV as evidenced by the 44 current members of UPOV of which 13 are developing countries, the latter bound only to the 1978 version. These are, in the order that they joined during the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] 
Clearly, WTO developing country members do not need to model their sui generis legislation on UPOV at all under TRIPS. However, the UPOV is the only international model available so far on PBRs and given the uncertainty on how the term 'effective' will be interpreted in a possible WTO dispute, following UPOV 1978 seems clearly a preferred option for many.
Trade secret protection
In discussions on TRIPS and biotechnology, trade secret protection is often overlooked. Trade secrets have to be protected in all WTO members under Article 39 of TRIPS. In cases where there is little possibility of independent discovery, trade secret protection can be very useful as it can potentially last forever. Breeders of new plant or animal varieties often keep the parent lines secret. Such protection is often quite effective for double-cross hybrid plant varieties as their first crossed parent lines can be closely guarded, while the subsequent seeds of such hybrids will not reproduce the same desired characteristics trueto-type. However, the disadvantage of such protection is that it does not protect the breeder against independent discovery by fair means. Usually, trade secrets are used to supplement and not substitute other IPRs, as sometimes such 'technological protection' may not be as strong as it appears. Newer technologies are being invented to strengthen such technological protection, giving rise to widespread protests, particularly in developing countries [6] .
Intellectual property rights and biodiversity conservation
The link between IPRs and biodiversity emanates from the concept of 'bioprospecting'. In searching for new chemical entities or useful characteristics, some research-based industries have found it profitable to screen natural sources such as soil samples, marine waters, insects, tropical plants and genes in developing countries. Some feel that, as compared to the conventional system of screening millions of synthesized chemicals, bioprospecting, especially if further based on traditional knowledge, may even cut costs of pharmaceutical R&D by half. The link to IPRs arises from the fact that in many instances, the bioprospectors or their licensees are granted patent rights over these products, without any acknowledgement of the contribution of countries/regions of origin or of indigenous communities. Developing countries are demanding that when profits are reaped through bioprospecting, benefits and technologies developed should be shared with the original suppliers of genetic resources or traditional knowledge.
Another question linked to this demand is the conceptualization of a new type of IPRs or other legal or economic systems that recognize the innovative contributions that farmers and indigenous communities have made over generations using locally available natural resources so that these are not freely appropriated by others. Many argue that if these measures are not taken, there would be little incentive for people in developing countries to maintain or to enhance earth's biodiversity, which may, in turn, harm research and development for medicines or useful agricultural products.
However, others believe that with the recent advances in combinatorial chemistry, biological compounds can be synthesized and that this route would be increasingly pursued if access to genetic resources is made more difficult [7] . In addition, recent research by economists has also shown that the value of biodiversity for use in pharmaceutical research may be as low as a few cents per hectare even in the world's biodiversity 'hotspots' and that this may not significantly contribute to preserving biodiversity [8] . Certainly, to date, few countries have obtained significant financial returns and it is presently not evident that controlling genetic access will be effective or profitable.
It is in the wake of the recent advances in biotechnology and the extension of patent protection to living organisms, that both developed and developing countries realized the importance of access to genetic resources. This was the basis for the conclusion of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro. The CBD reaffirms that countries have sovereign rights over their own biological resources, including genetic resources, and calls for the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The problem lies in the ambiguous wording and lack of credible enforcement mechanisms for the provisions of the CBD.
Access to genetic resources is governed by Article 15 of the CBD. Such access has to be on mutually agreed terms (Article 15.4) and subject to prior informed consent (Article 15.5). The results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources have to be shared in a fair and equitable way with the country providing such resources, on mutually agreed terms (Article 15.7). It is not clear in this context what 'fair and equitable' means as these terms are to be agreed mutually and as there is no effective international arbitration envisaged on this. In addition, botanical gardens and seed banks may have up to one third of the world's plant species collected well before the CBD. The CBD does not require such banks to adopt policies of prior approval by countries holding the original genetic resources for previous collections. This means that these genetic resources can be accessed without any obligation to share benefits with the source countries [9] . This is one of the difficult issues in the negotiations in the FAO where there is some support for treating such samples on par with the post-CBD samples.
Under Article 16 of the CBD, access to genetic resources is juxtaposed against requirements on the transfer of technology, including biotechnology. Article 16 enjoins parties to provide access to and transfer of technology "under fair and most favorable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms" to the countries providing the genetic resources. For technologies covered by IPRs these terms must be "consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights" and "in accordance with international law" (emphasis added). Nevertheless, parties are to cooperate, "subject to national and international law ", to ensure that IPRs are supportive of and do not run counter to the objectives of the CBD. The ambiguous, and sometimes contradictory, wording of this article reflects the difficulties encountered in the negotiations: of reconciling the demand of developing countries to fair access to technologies involving the use of their genetic resources and the position of developed countries on respecting IPRs. In the end, the compromise reached on this provision has given rise to as many contentious issues as it set out to solve. Article 27 and Annex II of the CBD deals with the settlement of disputes between parties on the interpretation of the treaty but this is not subject to the strict time limits and punitive trade sanctions as in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
Developing countries and some environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) claim that TRIPS needs to be reconciled with the CBD. However, the terms 'adequate and effective protection' of IPRs originate from the US trade law, which envisages unilateral action against countries not according such a level of protection, and similar wording is repeated in the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, it would appear that the language in the CBD safeguards the interests of intellectual property right holders in the biotechnology industry, to the extent provided for in TRIPS.
The issue of knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities is addressed in Article 8(j). Parties are encouraged to equitably share the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge 'as far as possible', 'as appropriate' and subject to national legislation. 'Farmers' rights', or compensation to local farming communities for collective improvements to plant varieties, is not specifically addressed under this article of the CBD but countries are free to frame their legislation on this subject. This concern was first discussed in the FAO's International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources in 1989 which recognized that PBRs were not incompatible with its objective of access to and sustainable use of plant genetic resources.
Some point out that at the time of this resolution the prevailing international law on PBRs was UPOV, 1978 but do not explain why UPOV 1991 has changed this situation in any fundamental way [10] . Presently, negotiations are in progress in the FAO to reconcile the Undertaking with the CBD and define the content of farmers' rights. However, few countries have actually introduced legislation rewarding such rights. Much more work needs to be done in international forums to conceptualize these issues in clearer terms.
Given the unclear and ambiguous language of the CBD and the near absence of national legislation on bioprospecting until recently, the commercialization of biotechnological products and processes, based on genetic resources obtained from developing countries, continues to be based on free market principles of demand and supply. Only a few companies voluntarily share benefits on mutually agreed terms in return for access to genetic resources or traditional knowledge [11] . However, more time is required to judge whether legislation will work towards improving or restricting access to genetic resources and whether developing countries would benefit substantively from it.
There is a fear that patents will be granted directly for biological products taken from developing countries. By definition, patents cannot be granted for substances that exist in nature or traditional knowledge taken as it is, as these do not fulfil the criterion of novelty. However, the procedures followed in determining the novelty of patentable inventions differ even amongst industrialized countries. Developing countries rightly believe that patent systems that are not based on searching both the written and oral prior art for world-wide novelty, such as is the case in USA, and that do not insist on disclosure of the origin and proof of prior informed consent, as few countries do today, for the use of the biological materials or traditional knowledge on which the invention is based, help in perpetuating the iniquitous system.
In one of the most coherent demands made, India had demanded an amendment to Article 29 of TRIPS in the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment on conditions that can be imposed on patent applicants to incorporate adequate disclosure of country of origin. In recent discussion, developing countries have extended their demand to prior informed consent (PIC). They could argue that without an amendment to TRIPS, there is no legal basis for benefit sharing, such as those based conceptually on 'reach-through' agreements or co-inventorship that are already established patent law practices in developed countries.
Also, without easy access to the knowledge of patent filing no opposition proceedings can be planned or contracts negotiated on mutually agreed terms. Developed countries argue that disclosure of origin is already required by most patent offices but that PIC, at this initial stage when the commercial value is not clearly known, may be unnecessarily burdensome on patent applicants. In addition, there are problems in correctly identifying the country of origin [12] . It is possible to counter these arguments with more practical solutions, but clearly this is the strategy that should be followed. In the run up to 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference, demands relating to biodiversity made by a large number of developing countries, dominated the discussions on the review of Article 27.3(b).
Review of TRIPS Article 27.3(b)
Built into Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS is a provision for this clause to be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO i.e. any time after 1999. At the time of the TRIPS negotiations it was expected that, after the passing of the European Biotechnology Directive, united pressure could be placed on developing countries by the USA, Europe and Japan in 1999 for the acceptance of patents on all eligible biotechnological inventions, including plants and animals. Clearly, research-based agricultural biotechnology companies would be particularly interested in plant patents as PBRs, with breeders' exemption and farmers' privilege, may not be sufficient to recoup their investment on R&D. While farmers' privilege may, to some extent, be restricted by the use of hybrids or in the future, possibly by using the so-called Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs), breeders cannot legally or technically be excluded under PBRs.
The USA had made preliminary proposals on the built-in agenda in the WTO, including on TRIPS, in November 1998 [13] . In the context of biotechnology, these proposals call for an examination of the desirability of eliminating the exclusion for plants and animals and incorporation of the key provisions of UPOV on plant variety protection. The US has, however, not pressed for any immediate modification to TRIPS on biotechnological inventions. On the other hand, USTR officials have repeatedly stated in public that the focus for the next few years would be on implementation and dispute settlement rather than on strengthening TRIPS further.
This position reflects that of the international business community, which is reluctant to re-open the debate on Article 27.3(b) [14, 15] . One reason could be that some view this as risky as it would endanger the advances already made in Europe in this area, given the fact that there is not yet complete legal certainty on this issue and that European protection is not yet at the US level. Moreover, as many countries have time up to January 2000 to change their laws to implement this provision of TRIPS, it may be considered premature to review this so early. One more reason for such caution could be the preparations being made by developing countries to demand changes in TRIPS. Paradoxically, in the preparations for the 1999 WTO Ministerial meeting there were many more proposals for changing the TRIPS text on Article 27.3(b) from developing countries than from developed countries.
In a recent proposal in the WTO an important group of developing countries from Latin America, Africa and Asia have proposed substantive revisions to Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS to incorporate their concerns on biodiversity, equity and transfer of technology [16] . They have demanded that the review of the provision clarify artificial distinctions between biological and microbiological organisms and processes, ensure traditional farming practices and prevent anti-competitive practices.
Some fear that the term 'microorganism' could be interpreted as extending to genes and even to plants and animals and call for a clarification in TRIPS that the option to exclude from patentability extends to microorganisms and microbiological processes [17, 18] . India, supported by other countries, has gone as far as to demand the prohibition of patents inconsistent with Article 15 of the CBD, although it is not clear what such consistency would entail. Some African countries are also demanding that the period for the implementation of Article 27.3(b) should be extended further and should end five years from the date of the completion of the review.
It is not clear how far these proposals represent negotiating tactics as opposed to real interests. It is also difficult to see how a definition of ambiguous terms favourable to developing countries, even less their exclusion, could be adopted by consensus in the WTO, raising the question whether these countries are better off with the current ambiguity. It is also unclear how much developing countries are willing to trade-off to obtain their demands on the biodiversity set of issues. But demandeurs for strengthened IPR protection may have reason to fear further weakening of the TRIPS text in any premature review, particularly given the support to developing countries from powerful developed country NGO groups.
The way forward for developing countries
To conclude, the TRIPS provisions on patents for biotechnological inventions already allow considerable leeway to developing countries through exclusions from patent grant, ambiguous wording and exceptions to patent rights. Indeed, these provisions have been implemented in a number of different ways by both developed and developing countries. Ambiguities on these and on plant variety protection will only be resolved if and when these are settled in a future WTO dispute or in future negotiations. Instead of demanding clarifications on these ambiguities in the WTO, a task rendered difficult by the existing process of decision making by consensus, developing countries are better off interpreting them in reasonable and clearly defensible ways.
IPRs for biotechnological inventions, however, do pose complex problems relating to access to technologies, unfair exploitation of genetic resources and fair and equitable sharing of the financial benefits. Although steps are necessary to preserve existing biodiversity and enhance equity in international obligations, financial benefits from genetic access legislation may often be exaggerated. Certainly, it would be paradoxical if these countries forego the potential benefits of biotechnology to solve some of their most pressing problems of poverty, disease and malnutrition on account of exaggerated fears or hopes.
Clearly, the more important policy objective should be to develop competitive skills in research in biotechnology. For this, local firms, in both the public and private sector, must be encouraged through the grant of adequate and effective IPR protection, at least up to the level obligatory currently under TRIPS. Some developing countries have already seen the wisdom of going on to the next stage of granting patents for plants, genes and animals and many others may do so, once domestic research capabilities in biotechnology improve. It should be noted that the grant of IPRs does not necessarily preclude the dissemination of these technologies or products by public institutions to certain groups or areas either free or at reasonable prices.
Yet patents should not permit the blocking of research or competition in these areas through overly broad grants and competition policy instruments should be instituted and used. To safeguard against the adverse effects of restricting competition, liberal use should be made of the flexibility available under TRIPS to grant compulsory licences in cases of egregious anti-competitive behaviour by right holders or for gaining access to essential blocking patents. No further amendments are needed to TRIPS for this purpose.
However, given the existing technological gap between lead developed and developing countries and the capital-intensive nature of product development, the best way forward for developing countries seems to be collaboration and not confrontation. Multilateral developmental institutions should also be encouraged to help developing countries make the transition to a higher level of capabilities in biotechnology through both financial and technical assistance for R&D projects, including on obtaining and defending IPRs.
Such institutions could even consider playing the role of the 'honest broker' in the purchase of core, privately-developed IPR-covered biotechnological inventions in essential areas, such as important and unique food crops or medicines, in order to ensure their widest dissemination, at reasonable costs to poorer countries. This could be achieved by, in turn, sub-licensing production to the cheapest possible sources in the world, most likely the larger developing countries, and perhaps, even further subsidizing the protected products at the point of consumption. As long as these poorer markets are effectively segregated to prevent arbitrage, this could help resolve the conflict between rewarding private innovations through IPRs for generating such useful technologies and ensuring their widest possible use in and benefit to poorest, least-developed countries.
For the private IPR holder the trade-off between volumes and value should make such open licensing beneficial, as he would obtain sales/royalties that were not otherwise possible. Indeed, there are parallels of such trade-offs in the information technology and telecommunications sector where IPR holders voluntarily submit their IPRs to open licensing at reasonable terms in order to benefit from incorporation of their proprietary technologies into industry-wide standards set by industry associations, governments or international bodies.
None of these options on collaboration with IPR holders are foreclosed by TRIPS and developing countries may see wisdom in not re-opening negotiations on the TRIPS text for the present. Proposals on the biodiversity set of issues can and should be raised, in appropriately concrete terms, only to counter developed countries' demands for further protection of biotechnological inventions under TRIPS. Till such time, the present TRIPS text is sufficiently flexible to accommodate solutions to problems raised by developing countries so far.
